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ABSTRACT 
The dynamic rural nonfarm sector in China has been a major contributor to the 
country’s remarkable growth, while in India the growth in output and employment in this 
sector has been rather stagnant. The paper argues that the observed patterns in the rural 
nonfarm development are the results of institutional differences between the two 
countries, especially in their political systems, ownership structure, and credit 
institutions. A review of the strengths and weaknesses of the rural nonfarm economy in 
China and India highlights the potentials and challenges of growth in the sector.   
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RURAL NONFRAM DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA AND INDIA: 
THE ROLE OF POLICES AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
 





China and India together constitute more than one-third of the world’s population. 
At the beginning of the 1950s, both China and India were mainly rural, low-income 
economies, with agriculture as the predominant sector of the economy. Over the last five 
decades, China and India have made dramatic improvements in their standard of living, 
structural transformation of the economy and development of the secondary and tertiary 
sectors.  Agricultural growth has made both countries self-sufficient in food, providing a 
residual surplus for export and capital for other sectors.  The rural sector, as a result, has 
undergone substantial changes in composition.  Industries and services now form an 
integral part of the output and employment of the rural sector.  The share of agriculture in 
total GDP has declined to less than one-third in India and less than one-fifth in China.  
This transition is remarkable considering the initial situation in the two countries half a 
century ago.  
The rural nonfarm sector has played a key role in the economic transition of both 
countries over the past two decades.  A look behind the macro-economic aggregates 
reveals more rapid growth of rural nonfarm employment in China than in India, 
especially over the decade of the 1990s.  After the initiation of the open-door policy in 
China, the dynamic rural nonfarm sector has been a major contributor to the country’s 
remarkable export growth in recent years.  Rural township and village enterprises 
(TVEs), and more recently private enterprises (PEs), have generated large amounts of 
                                                 
1 Anit Mukherjee is a Collaborator from the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy in India and 
Xiaobo Zhang is a Research Fellow from Development Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD) of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).   8
employment for the rural labor force and have absorbed the labor released from 
agriculture.  
In India too, the small-scale sector, including traditional village industries, 
contributes nearly two-thirds of organized sector employment.  After a period of 
sustained expansion in the 1980s, however, growth in output and employment in this 
sector has fallen significantly.  During the 1990’s, when China’s rural manufacturing 
sector was thriving, India witnessed a decline in the share of rural nonfarm manufacturing 
in national GDP.  Compared to China, rural nonfarm employment has increased only 
moderately (Figures 1 and 2).
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Source: India - National Sample Survey Organization, Various Years; China - Fan, 
Robinson and Zhang (2003).  
                                                 
2 As in any comparative exercise, data comparability poses a challenge.  Definitions of “rural” as well as 
coverage of “nonfarm” activities both merit attention.  India defines rural areas as all localities with 
population below 5,000, population density below 400 persons per square kilometer and at least 75 per cent 
of the male working population engaged in agriculture.  In China, the household registration system known 
as hukou has generally been used to demarcate rural and urban areas.  Although many rural localities in 
China have grown into small towns over the last half a century, they remain classified as “rural.”  Thus, the 
less rapid growth in “rural” nonfarm employment in India may stem, in part, from the automatic 
reclassification of rural areas as “urban” as the nonfarm economy goes.  For rural enterprises in India, the 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) provides data for manufacturing units only, but National Sample Survey 
(NSS) on employment and National Accounts Statistics (NAS) include all types of rural establishments, 
both in industry as well as in commerce and services.  Statistics on rural enterprises in China include all 
enterprises at or below the township level.  Apart from manufacturing, the data includes enterprises 
engaged in transportation, commerce, construction and food services.  These caveats have to be kept in 
mind while analyzing the rural nonfarm sector in the two countries.   9




















Source: India - National Sample Survey Organization, Various Years; China - Fan, 
Robinson and Zhang (2003).  
This paper examines why development of the rural nonfarm sector has followed 
different paths in China and India over the past two decades and whether this can help us 
better understand differences in the overall performance of the two countries.  Can the 
differences be explained by the evolution of policy-making directed at the rural nonfarm 
sector over the period leading up to the late-1970s?  How much of the current growth or 
stagnation are the results of institutional differences between the two countries, especially 
in their political systems, ownership structure, credit institutions and macro-economic 
policies?  What lessons can be learned from the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
rural nonfarm sector in the two countries?  Lal (1995) compares the economic 
liberalization in China and India up to 1990. However, because most India’s 
liberalization policies did not fully start until the early 1990s, it is necessary to extend his 
comparison to a later period. This paper tries to fill the gap with a particular focus on the 
rural nonfarm sector.  
These questions hold implications for smaller developing countries as well.   
Ongoing globalization and structural adjustment policies have played a key role in 
driving recent changes in rural nonfarm economies across the developing world.  With 
China and India joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), these two large and   10
growing economies exert an increasing impact on world markets for goods as well as 
services.  An examination of the causes, potentials, strengths, and weaknesses in China 
and India should, therefore, provide useful indications for other developing countries in 
the process of nurturing a viable rural nonfarm sector in the current global context.   11
II.  POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR NONFARM DEVELOPMENT 
To understand the context of rural nonfarm sector development, it is necessary to 
look at the path of policy-making since independence in India and China.  In this section, 
we focus on those aspects of policy decisions that have had the most significant impact 
on the rural nonfarm sector.   
Common Threads 
Agriculture.  Rural development policy in both India and China has focused on 
agriculture, in policy formulation, allocation of public investments and recurrent budgets.  
Beginning earlier in India, these considerable investments in research, infrastructure, 
rural credit, and price support programs led to the launching of green revolution in rice 
and wheat production from the second half of the 1960’s onwards (Fan, Hazell and 
Thorat, 1999).  In China, rural nonfarm began to take off in the agriculturally advanced 
regions only after the rapid growth in the agricultural sector form 1978 to 1984. In both 
countries, agricultural prosperity has fueled rural economic growth, enabling transfers of 
labor and capital from agriculture to manufacturing and services while ensuring 
moderation in urban food prices. In many ways, agricultural policy has formed the corner 
stone of rural nonfarm policy in both countries.  
Commerce and services.  In the rural nonfarm economy specifically, both India 
and China have concentrated policy and support programs almost exclusively on 
manufacturing.  Both have largely ignored rural commerce and services.  Instead, the 
bulk of policy attention has focused on rural industry and on related macro-economic 
policies.  In spite of this policy de-emphasis, rural commerce and services have 
flourished, proving the most buoyant segments of the rural nonfarm economy in both 
India and China over the past two decades (Tables 1, 2, 3).  In India, rural commerce 
andservices are now roughly twice the size of the manufacturing sector in terms of 
employment (Table 1).     12
Table 1.  Distribution of Total Employment in India (%), 1978-2000 
Rural Urban 
Industry Division  1977-













Agriculture and Allied Activities  83.4 81.2 78.3 78.4 76.3  15.3 14.6 13.4 12.3  8.6 
Mining and Quarrying  0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5  0.8 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.8 
Manufacturing  6.2 6.7 7.2 7.0 7.3  28.0 26.7 26.0 23.6 22.7 
Utilities  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 
Construction  1.3 1.7 3.3 2.4 3.3  3.8 4.7 5.4 6.3 8.0 
Wholesale and Retail Trade and 
Restaurants and Hotels  3.3 3.5 4.0 4.3 5.1  18.8 18.4 19.0 19.4 26.9 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication  0.8 1.1 1.3 1.4 2.1  7.9 8.1 7.8 8.0 8.7 
Service  4.4 4.9 5.0 5.7 5.2  24.6 25 25.7 28.2 23.6 
Total  100 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100 
Total Employment (Million)  221.3 243.1 252.5 290.3 300.8 49.2 59.6 69.5 81.8  96 
Source: National Sample Survey 
Table 2.  Distribution of Rural Net Domestic Product (India) – Farm and Nonfarm 
Share in Rural NDP  Share of Rural Areas in 
Total NDP  Industry Division 
1980-81 1999-00 1980-81 1999-00 
Agriculture and Allied Activities  64.36 54.41 94.89 94.04 
Manufacturing  9.16 8.13  31.84 29.58 
a. Registered  3.15 5.13  20.37 30.05 
b. Unregistered  6.01 3.00  45.18 28.81 
Utilities  0.56 1.34  40.02 40.37 
Construction  4.05 4.99  45.62 39.12 
Trade and Restaurants and Hotels  6.68 6.94  30.34 22.82 
Transport, Storage and Communication  1.32 4.17  22.99 34.39 
Real Estate and Business Services  4.55 3.16  49.88 29.32 
Community Social and Personal Services  7.27 12.50  39.08 41.70 
Total Rural Nonfarm Sector  35.64 45.59 34.97 31.64 
Total Net Domestic Product (%)  100 100  58.91 49.52 
Source: National Accounts Statistics, Government of India (Adapted from Chadha, 2003) 
Rationale.  The rationale in both countries for developing the rural nonfarm sector 
has been essentially the same: to provide employment to a growing rural population, 
produce goods and services for local consumption, to reap the comparative advantage in 
terms of labor-intensive modes of production, and to forge links with large-scale, capital   13
intensive urban industry.  Both the countries have had some success in meeting these 
objectives. 
While both countries have maintained a common focus on rural industry, policy 
specifics have differed in India and China, as the following discussion will reveal.   
Table 3.  Employment in China’s TVEs, 1978-1997 
Employment in TVEs  Sectoral share within TVEs (%) 
Year 
Millions 












1978 28  9  22  61  8  4  5 
1980 30  9  15  65  11  4  5 
1983 32  9  10  67  15  3  5 
1984 52  15  5  70  13  2  9 
1990 93  22  3  60  15  8  15 
1995 129  29  2  59  15  7  16 
1997 131  28  2  47  10  3  38 
Note: Data before and after 1984 are not comparable because of changes in statistical coverage. 
Source: Huang (1999), taken from Statistical Yearbook of China, and Township and Village Enterprises 
Yearbook of China, various issues. 
 
Industrial Policy in India 
The early independence years 
In India, in the decades following World War II, the newly independent central 
government placed primary investment priority on heavy, urban-based manufacturing.  
The emphasis after independence was to substitute imported consumer goods by local 
manufactures.  It is interesting to note that the very first Industrial Policy Resolution in 
post independence India in 1948 mentioned China as a model to be followed in order to 
organize the cottage and small-scale industries into effective institutions for providing 
employment opportunities.
3  Under Nehru’s leadership, the emphasis of the Industrial 
                                                 
3 “Cottage and small-scale industries have a very important role in the national economy. Offering as they 
do scope for individual, village or co-operative enterprise, and means for the rehabilitation of displaced 
persons…One of the main objectives will be to give a distinctly co-operative bias to this field of industry. 
During and before the last war, even a predominantly agricultural country like China showed what could be 
done in this respect and her mobile industrial co-operative units were of outstanding assistance in her 
struggle against Japan” (Industrial Policy Resolution, Government of India, 1948).  
   14
Policy Resolution of 1956 turned to large-scale capital-intensive industries such as steel, 
petrochemicals, engineering, machinery, etc., under the public sector umbrella.  The 
second Five-Year Plan of 1956 (which came to be known as the Mahalonobis model) set 
the stage for the development of India’s heavy industry.  
At the same time, policies reserved special concessions for household and small 
industry, the village and khadi (handloom) industries, championed by Gandhi and his 
followers.  The ‘small-scale’ industry was supposed to supply the consumer goods 
needed by workers in the large-scale sector.  The model, therefore, merged Gandhi and 
Nehru’s divergent visions of industrial development in post-independence India (Little, 
Majumdar and Page, 1987).  The Small Scale Industries Board (SSIB) and the Central 
Small Industries Organization (CSIO) were set up following the recommendation of the 
Ford Foundation team in 1954.  These institutions helped in laying the groundwork for 
the development of the small-scale manufacturing sector for the next two decades.   
Through a system of direct licensing, production controls in large manufacturers, 
differential taxation and direct subsidies, they reserved over 800 items – including 
handlooms, pottery, match making and sericulture – for rural and small-scale producers 
(Kashyap, 1988).  Direct and indirect subsidy rates reached as high as 70% of factory 
price (Sandesara, 1980).   
With the green revolution in agriculture, farm output and productivity increased in 
most parts of rural India.  There was a growing demand for goods and services produced 
locally throughout the 1970s.  Since there was no barrier to entry, small household 
enterprises catering to the need of the farm sector flourished in all segments of the 
nonfarm sector, especially in manufacturing, transport and services.  The positive farm-
nonfarm linkage theory, corroborated by several empirical studies (Hazell and 
Haggblade, 1991), was reflected in the government’s policy pronouncements, especially 
the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1980. 
The decade of the 1980s was actually the best to date in terms of employment 
growth.  A policy of protection, domestically through licensing of small-scale units and 
externally through quantitative quotas on imports, coupled with cheap credit, investment   15
subsidy and infrastructure provision was instrumental in bringing about a substantial 
increase in both employment and output share of the rural nonfarm sector.  Rural 
employment, especially rural nonfarm employment, grew rapidly.  Backward linkage 
from nonfarm employment to agriculture may have sustained the productivity increase in 
the farm sector during this period (Fan, Hazell and Thorat, 1999; Mukherjee and Kuroda, 
2001).  More than 45 million jobs were created in the rural areas during the 10-year 
period 1983 – 93, most of which were in the nonfarm sector (Table 1). However, unlike 
China there was no large-scale shift in labor shares between the farm and nonfarm 
sectors. 
Reform 
A balance of payments crisis at the beginning of the 1990s produced a macro-
economic crisis for the Indian economy.  In response, in 1991 the government adopted a 
policy of economic reform, both in the domestic as well as the external sector.  The most 
significant aspect of the domestic reform agenda was the liberalization of the industrial 
sector.  The Industrial Policy Statement of July 1991 abolished licensing (known as the 
‘license-permit raj’) that gave rise to rents and corruption in the industrial sector.   
Although the sectors of industry reserved for the small-scale sector remained intact, there 
was a shift from non-tariff barriers to tariff rates that decreased over the 1990s.  The 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act was amended to remove the 
limit on capital investment.  This eliminated the requirement of prior approval of the 
Central Government for establishment of new undertakings, expansion of undertakings, 
merger, amalgamation and takeovers within the industrial sector.  Policy emphasized 
exports to earn foreign exchange.  All industrial units with export potential were allowed 
to import capital equipment freely. 
The economic reform process adversely affected the small-scale sector, especially 
rural manufacturing.  Growth in small-scale units fell by more than half, from over 9 
percent in the period between 1981-1986 to 4.3 percent in 1996 – 2001.  Except for 
exports, similar decreases in growth rates were recorded for output and employment in   16
small-scale manufacturing during the two periods (Bala Subrahmanya, 2004).  The share 
of the rural nonfarm sector in total nonfarm Net Domestic Product (NDP) actually 
decreased from nearly 35 percent in 1981 to 31.6 percent in 2001.  This indicates that a 
widening gap between secondary and tertiary activity and between rural and urban areas, 
with serious consequences for both regional as well as rural-urban income distribution 
(Table 2).   
Industrial Policy in China 
Pre-reform 
Interest in the development of the rural nonfarm sector in China is of a more 
recent vintage as compared to India.  During the 1950s, China’s leaders and policymakers 
were preoccupied with ‘catching-up’ with the developed world, primarily Japan.  They 
placed overwhelming emphasis on heavy industries, and the relative price of agricultural 
commodities was kept artificially low to transfer resources from rural to urban areas (Lin 
and Yao, 1999).   
Promotion of rural industry began during Mao’s Great Leap Forward in 1958 with 
the establishment of large numbers of rural iron and steel foundries aimed at serving 
agriculture and helping rural areas to “walk on two legs” (Ho, 1986).  During the 1960’s 
and 1970’s, government promotion efforts focused on five small industries – iron and 
steel, fertilizer production, cement, coal and hydroelectric power plants, and machine 
building – aimed at providing modern inputs for agriculture (Perkins, 1977; Sigurdson, 
1977; Saith, 1980).  This rapid, mandated expansion resulted in overdevelopment of 
heavy rural manufacturing activity (Table 4).  Many plants proved to be technically 
inefficient and economically unviable (Ho, 1986).   
Rural nonfarm activity was collectivized during the first five-year plan (1953-
1957).  Then, in 1958, the Communist Party leadership transformed the rural nonfarm 
activities into commune-brigade enterprises (CBSs).  In China’s command economy, 
these rural enterprises faced severe discrimination in material and equipment allocations 
as urban manufacturing enterprises received priority.  Forced to adapt to these shortages,   17
the rural CBS endured the sting of periodic criticism as ‘the tails of capitalism’ (Ho, 
1986).  Major reforms since the late 1970s enhanced priority for CBE’s by providing tax 
concessions to qualified enterprises and instructions that urban industries farm out 
production to CBS wherever possible.  The dismantling of the commune system in 1984 
led to the development of TVEs and private enterprises as described  below.   
Table 4.  Composition of Rural Nonfarm Employment in China, 1981 
Nonfarm activities  Employment Share 
Manufacturing 45% 
Construction 9% 
Commerce and commercial services  12% 
Transport and communication  5% 
Services (including government)  28% 
Total 100% 
Source: Ho (1986).   
Post-reform 
After a decade of social and economic turmoil between 1966 to 1976, China’s 
economic reforms started in earnest under Deng Xioping from 1978 onwards.  The 
commune system was abolished and the household responsibility system (HRS) came 
into force.  The former commune and brigade enterprises that operated under the old 
system of rural collective enterprises were renamed ‘township and village enterprises’ or 
TVEs.  Agricultural productivity increased dramatically between 1978 and 1985, and the 
TVE sector flourished concurrently (Fan, Zhang, and Robinson, 2003).  
From the early 1980s, therefore, there is evidence of structural change in the 
Chinese economy (Fan, Zhang and Robinson, 2003).  The most significant aspect of this 
transformation is undoubtedly the development of the rural nonfarm sector.  From being 
inconsequential in the late 1970s, the rural nonfarm sector, especially rural industries, has 
matured over the last three decades.  Considering its growing importance in employment,   18
output and export, China’s rural nonfarm sector is the main source of the high rates of 
economic growth in the recent past.
4 
Rural industrialization in China after the start of reforms in the late 1970s can be 
divided into four distinct periods (Lin and Yao, 1999).  In the first phase from 1978 to 
1984, rural industrial growth was overshadowed by the unparalleled performance of 
agriculture which largely benefited from the rural reform. By 1984, the TVEs produced 
nearly 16 percent of total industrial output compared to 9 percent in 1978. Its share in 
gross total rural output increased from 24 percent to 33 percent over the period and its 
share in rural labor significantly increased from 9 percent to 14.5 percent.   
The second period from 1984 to 1988 was marked by an acceleration in the rate 
of growth of output and employment in the rural nonfarm sector in China.  This period 
also coincided with more stable institutional arrangements in ownership and use of 
revenue generated in the TVEs.  Local governments took the lead in utilizing the capital 
accumulated during the previous phase of agricultural growth to set up rural industrial 
units catering to increased local demand.  There was a three-fold increase in the number 
of rural enterprises from 6 million in 1984 to more than 18 million in 1988.  The nonfarm 
share in total rural labor increased from 14.5 percent to nearly 24 percent, while the share 
in gross rural output increased by more than 20 percent from its 1984 level.  The stage 
was set for the structural transformation in the Chinese economy led by the rural nonfarm 
sector. 
The third period, from 1989 to 1991, was marked by a backlash from the 
government against the rural TVEs.  It is the only phase in the history of China’s nonfarm 
growth when the number, employment and share of output of the sector all declined.  
However, unlike India’s current predicament, this phase did not last long, and the 
political leadership under Deng Xioping came out in full support of the policy of 
continuing reform and openness in a famous 1992 visit to Guangdong. The opening up of 
                                                 
4 The rural sector is mainly defined by the household registration system.    19
the economy provided the TVE sector a broader space to compete both domestically and 
internationally.  
This clearing of ideological and political confusion has contributed to the current 
phase of expansion of the TVE sector.  By 1997, the rural TVE sector was employing 
nearly 30 percent of the rural labor force, producing nearly 80 percent of the gross rural 
output and nearly two-thirds of total industrial output.  Coupled with increased growth of 
rural ‘private enterprises’ (PE) and the tertiary sector, there is higher participation of 
private capital in the development of rural nonfarm sector.  By the end of the 1990s, 
China had privatized most of its TVEs.    20
III.  THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
Institutional developments and relationships translate government intentions, 
explicit or implicit, into action.  Institutional relationships and governance have evolved 
significantly in both countries over the past few decades, and in so doing they have 
influenced the current levels of dynamism in the rural nonfarm sector in China and India. 
The impact of institutions and governance needs to be analyzed from several 
vantage points.  Firstly, the differences in political economy have to be explained in order 
to appreciate the process of policy formulation, especially with regard to the rural 
nonfarm sector.  These differences translate into specific policies regarding the role of the 
state and private actors vis-à-vis the ownership structure, the creation of an enabling 
environment for the nonfarm sector (such as markets, infrastructure and other public 
goods), the incentives for promoting the rural nonfarm sector, as well as sustaining and 
expanding it.  The outcome of a particular set of policies can be seen both from the rates 
of growth of the sector as a whole, and also from the spatial differences in growth 
patterns.  Flexible institutions and responsive governance can correct for structural 
imbalances, and also eliminate differences between sectors and regions.  Therefore, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the rural nonfarm sector in China and India may also be 
thought of as an outcome of institutional development in the two countries reflecting 
economic priorities and political environments.  
Initial Endowments: Diverging Political and Economic Systems 
Comparisons of economic development between China and India dwell for the 
most part on the differences in political institutions and organization of the economy (Lal, 
1995).  It is true that this serves as a good first step towards analyzing the different paths 
that the two economies have taken over the last fifty years.  Our present mandate is to 
extend this analysis to assess their impact on the overall progress of the rural nonfarm 
sector.  This would be our contribution to understand better the similarities and contrasts 
between the rural nonfarm sectors in the two countries.    21
Policymaking in China is generally regarded as top-down, with the party 
hierarchy carrying out orders of the top leadership. The resulting strong organizational 
capital can be an asset in overcoming common coordination failure problems, if used 
correctly. In addition, China is a rather homogenous society, lowering the social cost to 
deal with conflict. In contrast, formation of policy in India is thought to be generally 
slower, as the democratic structure and various interest groups have to be taken on board 
before any radical shift in policy direction.   
Most studies on the differences in development between India and China have 
concentrated on democracy versus dictatorship or private initiative versus state-led 
development paradigms. In the case of the rural nonfarm sector, there is a tendency 
towards convergence in policy between the two countries. There are several points of 
similarity, as well as of contrast. From the point of view of the initial political and 
economic endowment, however, the differences can be summarized in terms of the ability 
of the two countries for collective action and to manage conflicts, both economic and 
political (Bardhan, 2003).  
A democratic structure is thought to restrict the opportunity for collective action. 
Voting in elections is a conduit for expressing opinion about policies and acts of the 
government, and mass mobilization in support or opposition to particular institutions is 
largely absent. Moreover, a democratic polity provides enough checks and balances to 
keep all interest groups in the ambit of political structure, and economic decisions are 
therefore more consensual and less radical. This in turn gives flexibility to the system to 
manage political, economic and social tensions. In a word, in a highly heterogeneous 
society like India, the democratic process is very important for conflict resolution. 
On the other hand, a one-party state such as China co-opts all interest groups 
within the party structure. Policies and programs once decided are implemented with 
collective zeal. This explains to a large extent how radical shifts in policy have taken 
place in China over the past 50 years, starting from the Great Leap Forward, to the 
Cultural Revolution, radical restructuring and reform from the late 70s, the reversal in the   22
late-80s to the initiation of even more radical market orientation policies in the mid-90s 
(Bardhan, 2003).   
The involvement of local leaders and common party cadres in initiating change in 
economic policy in China means that many of the reforms that occurred in the nonfarm 
sector in China were given an official stamp of approval long after they had been tested 
on the ground.  In contrast, local governance in India was restricted to the state level until 
recently, and many policy decisions such as land reforms could not be completed in most 
parts of the country due to lack of political will. 
When China started its major economic reform program in 1978, both land and 
human capital were much more evenly distributed than in India.  Reforms provided rural 
people, in particular those in the coastal area, with an opportunity to develop the local 
nonfarm economy. Due to the attachment to their land, many people chose to work in the 
nonfarm sector locally so as to tend their land on a part-time basis. Moreover because the 
majority in the labor force was well educated, a large proportion of the population could 
share the fruits of economic reform by working in the nonfarm sector, especially in rural 
manufacturing.  In contrast, due to the skewed land and human capital distribution in 
India, the less educated rural workforce seem to have lost out to the urban-based service 
industry that has benefited most from India’s gradual liberalization from the early 1990s. 
The initial endowment in the two countries, therefore, goes deeper than simplistic 
notions of democracy and state-control.  Differences in the political, social and economic 
institutions have shaped policy toward the rural nonfarm sector to a considerable extent.  
Ownership Structure: Private Initiative v/s Local Government Activism 
The historical evolution of the Indian non-agricultural economy has seen a 
dualism between public ownership of heavy industry and infrastructure (roads, electricity, 
water supply, telecommunication, banks etc.) and private initiative in almost every other 
sector of the economy. There has never been any restriction to private enterprise and 
private property.   23
On the other hand, for nearly three decades after independence, China followed a 
policy of collectivization in agriculture and national ownership of heavy industries. 
Private property was illegal, and the State had the liberty to fix prices. As we have seen in 
the previous section, the ‘price scissors’ were used effectively against agriculture to 
transfer resources to the urban areas. Moreover, the hukou, or household registration 
system, was used to regulate labor movement between the towns and the countryside. 
Despite its tremendous distortions on the labor market, it has a positive side effect of 
promoting local industrialization. No such restriction has ever been imposed on labor 
migration in India. 
This preamble is important for understanding the ownership structure of rural 
nonfarm enterprises in the two countries. As noted above, the nonfarm growth in India 
was an organic one, encompassing not only rural industry, but also service sectors such as 
trade, transport, community and social services (Table 1).  There was no institutional 
barrier in setting up rural nonfarm enterprises by private individuals. 
What the State did, however, was to regulate the scale of the enterprises, 
especially in manufacturing. The rural nonfarm enterprises were broadly classified into 
the traditional and modern sectors. The former were mainly home-spun cloth (Khadi) 
and handicrafts (pottery, basket-weaving etc.). The modern sector is divided into 
powerlooms which supply raw materials to the textile industry and all other types of 
manufactured goods and services that are present in the rural nonfarm sector. Over time, 
many manufacturing units have moved to the urban periphery, or have located 
themselves in rural towns to take advantage of market linkages and infrastructure, but are 
still classified as ‘rural’ enterprises. Both the traditional and the modern sector of rural 
enterprises fall under the umbrella of small-scale enterprises, encompassing those units 
below a threshold limit of capital investment, which is revised periodically.
5 
Therefore, the rural nonfarm enterprise sector in India is characterized by a clear 
ownership structure (private ownership of means of production), but not very clear 
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demarcation vis-à-vis location of the enterprises. However, there is considerable 
government intervention in the form of investment ceilings, implicit subsidies in capital 
and marketing, and until recently, protection of small-scale industry through licensing 
and import barriers. In other words, the regulatory burdens have translated into high 
transaction costs of setting up and running a business despite clear property right 
arrangements.  
China’s rural nonfarm development, on the other hand, has largely been driven by 
the growth of the TVEs. Unlike India, it is the local, and not the central government, that 
took the lead in actively promoting the TVEs. Consequently, there is no evidence of any 
ceiling on capital investment limiting the scale of the enterprises, but considerable debate 
about the ownership and incentive structure of rural firms. 
What is not in dispute is that the development of rural enterprises (REs) in China 
started from 1978 with the reform process. Most new entry firms were neither private nor 
state (i.e., national government) firms, but were owned and managed by the local 
governments (TVEs). In China, local governments played an active role in managing the 
agricultural collectives and the ‘commune and brigade’ under the old system. The 
management of local government bodies forms both the political and the administrative 
bureaucracy at the micro level.
6 Moreover, severe inter-jurisdictional competition forces 
local governments to create a business-friendly environment. This leads to a convergence 
in incentives for better performance in mobilizing resources for development. TVEs 
enjoyed a rather secure protection from the local government at the time when private 
property rights were not clearly defined on paper.  
However, from the mid-1980s, there began a large and growing presence of 
private enterprises (PEs). It is in the analysis of the relative contribution of TVEs and PEs 
to growth of the rural nonfarm sector that the issue of ownership has assumed 
significance. One theory (Qian, 2003) is that local government ownership is a halfway 
house between national and private ownership of the means of production. In the absence 
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of the rule of law to protect private property rights until recently, this innovation in 
ownership structure is more secure than those of private enterprises due to the protection 
of community governments.  From 1978 to 1993, the share of state-owned enterprises 
(owned by national or supra-local county governments) in total industrial output fell from 
78 percent to 43 percent, while that of non-state firms increased from 22 to 57 percent.  
Disaggregating further, within the non-state firms, the share of firms collectively owned 
by townships and villages went up from 22 to 42 percent, and that of private firms was 
around 15 percent in 1993, up from being non-existent at the beginning of the reform 
period (Qian, 2003).  
Because the rural nonfarm sector was not protected prior to the reform, China’s 
rural enterprises have been able to capture the market niche left by state-owned 
enterprises and reap the benefits of scale.  In contrast, there existed heavy regulations on 
both small-scale and large-scale industries in the private sector in India in the years prior 
to the start of economic reform. Therefore the private enterprises in China have more 
flexibility in terms of capital investment to adjust to increasing demand.  
After liberalization, large-scale firms in India have reaped the benefits, while the 
village industry sector has suffered from low levels of labor productivity. The 
comparison shows that nominally defined secure property rights alone cannot guarantee 
the attraction of investment. Removing the distortions inherent in the economic system 
and introducing competition may have a more important role to play in the development 
of a vibrant rural nonfarm sector.  
Provision of Local Public Goods 
Differences in policy regarding ownership and promotion of the rural nonfarm 
sector are manifested in the provision of local public goods, especially infrastructure, in 
China and India. It is well recognized that the rural nonfarm sector needs supporting 
infrastructure, both physical and social, for sustained growth. In keeping with differences 
between the development paths followed by the rural nonfarm sector in China and India,   26
there is a distinct difference between the way the provision of public goods has happened 
in the two countries.  
It is now widely recognized in official and academic circles in India that 
availability of local public goods in the rural areas has become a major bottleneck in the 
last decade and a half (Planning Commission, 2001).  As per the Industrial Policy 
Statement of 1977, industrial clusters were encouraged to take advantage of horizontal 
and vertical linkages. To promote rural small-scale industries, District Industrial Centers 
were formed, and entrepreneurs were encouraged to set up units with subsidized loans 
and reduced taxes. Nationalized banks had stipulated lending norms for loan 
disbursement in the ‘priority sector’.  
On the whole, central schemes and administrative guidelines to create an enabling 
environment for the rural nonfarm sector have not paid dividends.  This is borne out by 
Table 2, where the share of the nonfarm sector in total NDP falls between 1980 and 2000.  
Although the share of registered rural manufacturing (essentially the modern small 
industrial sector) has increased, there has been a substantial decline in the share of 
unregistered manufacturing, which provides the bulk of employment in the rural areas. 
In contrast, local public goods provision has been one of the critical inputs in the 
continuing growth of the rural nonfarm sector in China.  Unlike India, rural community 
governments focus on providing local public goods – building roads, providing water and 
irrigation systems, maintaining law and order, etc.  In this sense, the economic and social 
part of the administrative structure is more decentralized in China than in India. 
In the context of the rural nonfarm development in China, provision of local 
public goods is the crucial link between economic and political objectives of promoting 
TVEs by local governments (Qian, 2003).  Under the guidelines of the national 
government, nearly 59 percent of after-tax profits of TVEs were reinvested and the rest 
used for local public expenditure in 1992. This created positive linkages between 
performance of TVEs, with higher profits leading to greater ability to maintain and   27
improve capital stock, and benefiting the local community in terms of infrastructure, 
which, in turn, encouraged diversification of the rural nonfarm sector.  
Thus, decentralized provision of local public goods has been cited in the literature 
as one of the major factors sustaining the high growth of rural TVEs as well as PEs. The 
sharing of profit between the local and the national government creates a win-win 
situation, where higher reinvestment and better infrastructure leads to a cycle of growth 
in the nonfarm sector. However, questions have been raised recently about whether this 
creates path dependency in terms of the levels of development of the TVE sector between 
different regions of the country.  
Financing the Nonfarm Sector: Institutional Lending v/s Non-conventional Finance   
In the area of finance for the rural nonfarm sector, India and China have followed 
two very distinct paths.
7 The development of the rural sector in India, including both 
agriculture and industry, has been mirrored by government initiatives in the provision of 
organized credit from banks and other financial institutions. In 1973, when the Green 
Revolution was well under way in most parts of India, the government nationalized all 
domestic private banks, and brought them nominally under the control of the central 
bank. The demand for credit in the rural sector increased primarily due to the necessity of 
purchasing modern inputs such as fertilizer and machinery to augment agricultural 
production. Although lagging behind agriculture, the demand for credit from the rural 
nonfarm sector also went up in the late 1970s. If both sectors were to grow in a 
reasonably balanced way then clearly some specific government interventions were 
required. 
In the literature on institutional factors underlying the growth of China’s rural 
economy, the role of local governments and the incentive compatibility with regard to 
local government finances have received considerable attention. The government 
instituted a policy of ‘directed credit’ through the banking system in rural areas. Lending 
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norms were instituted for the priority sector, which in the non-food component of the 
total bank lending included mainly small-scale industry. Location of such industry in 
semi-urban or rural areas was one factor that qualified them for priority sector credit. The 
ratio of priority sector lending in the nonfarm sector has been remarkably stable at around 
36 percent over the last two decades. Moreover, the share of the small-scale sector in 
total gross nonfood credit has also not shown any fluctuation. This is in spite of the fact 
that between 1980 and 2000, there have been six changes of government, and economic 
reforms from 1991 onwards (Reserve Bank of India, Annual Reports, various years).  
The stability of the priority sector lending indicates a general consensus in 
government towards the promotion of the nonfarm sector. This may be due to the fact 
that credit delivery has always been an instrument of patronage during elections, with 
declaration of loan-waivers and loan-holidays. There is a growing critique about the role 
of directed credit in the government policy from the efficiency angle, both in terms of 
targeting as well delivery mechanisms (Economic and Political Weekly, 2004).  While a 
comprehensive review of government policy in this regard is outside the scope of the 
present study, a comparison can be drawn between the incentive compatibility of directed 
credit vis-à-vis decentralized system of financing that prevailed in China over the last two 
decades.  
Unlike India, access to formal credit institutions for the rural nonfarm enterprises 
in China has been limited, at least in the initial phases. Institutional innovations have also 
been far more diverse (Tsai, 2004). In the absence of a formal banking system, private 
credit, rural credit cooperatives and local government support were the only means by 
which the TVEs could access capital. However, the cooperatives lend mostly to the State 
owned Enterprises (SOEs), leading to a transfer of rural household savings to the urban 
sector (Lin and Yao, 1999).  Therefore, in explaining the productivity and efficiency of 
TVEs in rural China, the ‘hard budget constraint’ theory has received widespread 
attention (Bardhan, 2003). 
Under the innovative ownership structure of the TVEs, local governments had 
complete control over their finances, which provided incentives for promotion of the   29
sector. Higher profits meant higher revenues for investing in local public goods, which 
had both economic and political payoffs. Economically, regions with better infrastructure 
attracted more investment in the rural manufacturing sector, leading to higher 
employment and revenues.  
The compatibility of economic and political incentives together with limited 
access to institutional lending translated into pressure on the management of TVEs to 
increase profitability. Higher revenues were divided between local public goods and 
reinvestment in plant and equipment. As noted above, by 1993, nearly 60 percent of TVE 
profits were being reinvested. The coastal areas of China emerged as the manufacturing 
powerhouse both in the domestic and in the export market. The benefits of organic 
linkages between local government initiative, local public goods and rural manufacturing 
have, however, been unevenly distributed across the country.  
China’s phenomenal nonfarm enterprise growth through unconventional financing 
pattern provides a stark contrast to that of the stability of directed credit policy in India. 
At first glance, the policy prescription for other countries may well be that decentralized 
finance works better for promoting rural nonfarm enterprises. Recent experience with 
rural co-operatives in the agro-processing and dairy sectors in India may also lead one to 
conclude that hard budget constraints and local initiatives work better in the rural 
nonfarm sector.  
However, it must be kept in mind that China’s local government structure is a 
product of its political system. The incentive compatibility, therefore, has a historical 
path dependency. In most developing countries, the lowest tier of government does not 
exist, or even if it does, it is not empowered as in China.  
With the maturing of the market economy, China is also now setting up 
conventional institutions – an organized capital market and banking sector being two 
major institutional changes in that direction. With almost all the TVEs being privatized, 
credit constraints can force private enterprises to cut back on investment, leading to a 
slowing of rural nonfarm growth. The specter of a stagnant rural enterprise sector may   30
lead China to follow India’s path of directed credit through commercial banks; early 
signs point in that direction (Lin and Yao, 1999, p.9). 
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IV. ASSESSING  PERFORMANCE 
The various policy initiatives and associated institutional arrangements that have 
been implemented in India and China in recent decades have influenced the performance 
of the rural nonfarm economy in a variety of ways.  The resulting outcomes reflect 
comparative strengths and weaknesses of the sector in the two countries and will have a 
significant bearing on how the sector is able to respond to future challenges and 
opportunities. We discuss these issues below. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Rural Nonfarm Sector in India 
Performance 
In India, the rural nonfarm sector existed in a primitive form at the time of 
independence in 1947.  Over a hundred years of colonial rule had led to the systematic 
de-industrialization of key sectors of the economy, notably the handloom industry.  In 
response, the Ghandian nationalist reaction included a strong populist call for promotion 
of village and khadi industries.  This led to significant protection for specific labor-
intensive village and khadi industries during the four decades following independence.   
The initiation of economic reforms in the early 1990’s, however, has effectively 
removed protection on these village and khadi industries.  Less efficient than modern 
small industries (Chadha, 1993, 1996) and unable to compete on economic terms, many 
have closed down, leading to a halving of the rural income share earned in unregistered 
manufacturing establishments (Table 2).  Over the same period, from 1980 to 2000, the 
share of registered manufacturing units has increased from 3% to 5% of rural income, 
helping to stabilize and even increase rural manufacturing employment slightly (Table 1).  
The rural manufacturing sector thus appears to be undergoing a process of re-adjustment 
where unviable units are being weeded out while others grow and maintain their 
competitiveness.  With enabling policies along the lines of those adopted in China, rural 
manufactures can come out stronger in the process.   32
Rural services and commerce, however, have continued to grow rapidly.  The 
green revolution period, beginning in the mid-1960s in India, saw a rapid increase in 
agricultural output and productivity.  The nonfarm sector, especially rural services, grew 
to keep up with local demand.  Though more spontaneous than planned, this growth in 
rural commerce and services accounted for over 90% of the rural nonfarm income and 
employment share gains over the past two decades (Tables 1 and 2).  In general, India’s 
growth story in the decade of the 1990s has been one of rapid expansion of the service 
sector, which now has the largest share in GDP.  In some ways, India has bypassed the 
traditional progression from being an agricultural economy to an industrial one (Roach, 
2004).  With nearly 60 percent of the population still engaged in agriculture, there is an 
opportunity to redeploy labor to the rural service and commercial sector. One major 
strength of the Indian rural sector is the potential for structural transformation of the rural 
economy in the coming years, a process already achieved by China. 
Table 5.  Unemployment Rate in India – Rural and Urban (Current Daily Status 
Basis) 
Rural Urban   
Male Female Total  Male  Female  Total 
1977-78  7.1 9.2 7.7 9.2 14.5 10.3 
1983 7.5 9.0 7.9 9.4 11.0 9.5 
1987-88  4.6 6.7 5.3 8.8 12.0 9.4 
1993-94  5.6 5.6 5.6 6.7 10.5 7.4 
1999-00  7.2 7.3 7.2 7.2  9.8  7.7 
Source: National Sample Survey, various years 
Recent trends in rural unemployment, however, raise challenges ahead.  The 
lastest available figures show a sharp increase in rural unemployment, both for males and 
females, between 1994 and 2000 (Table 5).  This is in contrast to the previous trend of 
decline in the rates of unemployment both in the rural and the urban sector between the 
late 70s and the early 90s.  Given the context of extensive rural underemployment 
especially in agriculture, there is a danger that this open unemployment might lead to 
social tensions in the near future.  To mitigate the crisis, successive governments have 
resorted to generation of wage employment through rural public works projects.   33
Although they were supposed to be temporary, political considerations have prevented 
them from being discontinued.   
Strengths 
(i) Institutional Basis for Rural Nonfarm Sector.  In India, the institutions 
underlying the development of the rural nonfarm sector are very strong.  These include 
secure property rights; a well-developed financial system with preferential access to 
credit for the sector; supporting institutions such as the Small Industries Development 
Bank of India (SIDBI), State industrial corporations; policies and programs promoting 
linkages with agriculture, especially agro-industries; domestic marketing channels for 
rural nonfarm production; as well as government support in export promotion.  The 
institutional mechanisms for a rapid growth of the rural nonfarm sector are already in 
place. 
(ii) Ongoing Decentralization Process.  In a curious juxtaposition of political and 
economic considerations, over the last two decades the State governments in India have 
been able to exercise far more independence in decision-making than in the pre-1980 
period.  Regional parties are an integral part in coalition governments at the Center.  In 
turn, they have negotiated economic autonomy in the formation of state specific policies 
for development.  Moreover, with the opening up of the economy in 1991, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has come to play an important role in the overall policy environment.  
State governments are in competition with one another to attract higher FDI levels both in 
manufacturing and infrastructure.  In some ways, it mirrors the path followed by China, 
although the volume of FDI coming to India is less than 10 percent of that to China.  On 
the positive side, however, this creates an opportunity for higher levels of investment in 
the future. 
Weaknesses 
(i) Infrastructure.  The most significant bottleneck in generating higher levels of 
rural nonfarm activity in India is the quantity, quality and reliability of infrastructure. For   34
example, the recent World Bank Investment Climate Survey for India indicates that 
power outages were one of the most serious obstacles to the development of the nonfarm 
sector (Economist, 2005; World Bank, 2005).  Although corrective steps are now being 
taken, increased infrastructure remains the most important priority for the future.  To 
achieve a sustained growth rate of between 8 and 9 percent, the investment rate has to be 
stepped up from the current level of 24 percent to nearly 35 percent over the next decade, 
with investment directed at the rural sector (Planning Commission, 2000, p.57).   
(ii) Regulatory Restrictions on Small-scale Sector.  Regulation of the small-scale 
sector constitutes an important aspect of nonfarm development policy in India.  In the 
initial stages, capital investment restrictions were imposed to protect the small-scale 
sector, especially in rural areas, from predation by large industry.  Reservation of 
products for the sector was initiated to create a domestic market and quantitative 
restrictions imposed to protect them from competition from imports.  
At the end of the 1990s, however, these very policies have become detrimental to 
the dynamism of the small-scale sector, especially in the rural areas.  Capital investment 
limits have discouraged economies of scale, and concessions offered to small industry 
have created adverse incentives against re-investment.  Several official reports have 
recommended a substantial increase in the capital investment limit (from the present level 
of around $200,000) to make better use of technology and improve productivity 
(Planning Commission, 2000).  However, no such policy announcement has been made 
as yet. 
Reservation of products for the small-scale sector has gradually reduced in 
significance, although this has created rents within the system.
8  The decision of the 
government to put all the reserved items in the open general license category from April 
2005 would mean free import of such items at the prevailing tariff rate.  With the latter 
slated to come down over time to around 20 percent as per the WTO norms, this will 
effectively signal the end of protection for the small-scale industry.  Some sector 
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examples, such as shoes and textiles, indicate that India’s nonfarm sector can survive the 
competition both domestically and in the export market. 
(iii) Quality of Manpower   High levels of illiteracy in rural India have hampered 
the growth of the rural nonfarm sector. As is recognized today, education has both 
intrinsic and instrumental value (Sen, 1999).  Apart from having a positive correlation 
with wages, a minimum basic standard of education is necessary to apply for credit, to be 
aware of one’s rights and responsibilities and to deal with instances of corruption and 
malpractice.  Often, a lack of education is intrinsic to poverty, which seems to have been 
the case in India until recently.  
In the rural areas, lack of education leads to labor being stagnant in agriculture, or 
moving to casual work occupations in the nonfarm sector, and not to salaried 
employment with higher wages and benefits (Planning Commission, 2000).  Together 
with lack of technical skills, there is little incentive for rural firms to invest in technology, 
leading to low levels of labor productivity in the rural manufacturing sector compared to 
urban manufacturing (Chadha, 2003).  The same is true of the service sector as well, 
which has the potential for expansion given the already strong base in the urban 
economy.  Higher investment to improve both the quality and the access to education – 
primary, secondary and above – needs to be a priority for policymakers. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Rural Nonfarm in China 
Performance 
As the principal driver of China’s economic expansion, the rural nonfarm sector is 
vibrant in many respects.  While manufacturing continued to dominate rural nonfarm 
employment in China during the early reform years, evidence suggests that commercial 
and service activities have been growing more rapidly in recent years.  Over the period 
from 1984 to 1997, employment gains in commercial and service TVEs increased by 45 
million jobs, roughly double the 26 million jobs gained in manufacturing TVEs (Table 3).    36
This strong evidence of structural transformation is in large part due to the 
absorption of labor from agriculture into rural enterprises, as well as a high rate of 
technical change (Fan, Zhang and Robinson, 2003).  This indicates that China’s rural 
enterprise sector has broadened in scope and increased in scale, with positive effects on 
capital and labor productivity.  Compared to India, China has been able to reap the 
benefits of scale economies, which has been noted even in official documents in India 
(Planning Commission, 2000). More ominously, signs of increasing regional inequality 
are emerging as well, driven by the very development of the rural nonfarm sector and 
public investments (Zhang and Fan, 2004).  Moreover, financial sector rigidities may 
hinder the deployment of capital in the rural sector (Zhang and Tan, 2004).   
Strengths 
(i) FDI inflows and resulting technical change.  Empirical analysis of China’s 
economic transformation points to an important contribution of technical change. Fan, 
Zhang, and Robinson (2003) show for the economy as a whole, 42% of total GDP growth 
was from technical change, while in the rural nonfarm sector, the contribution was high at 
53%.  Foreign direct investment has accounted for part of these gains, bringing with it 
new technologies and ways of doing business.  Scope still remains for increasing returns 
to capital by investing more in agriculture and rural industry.  This offers the prospects 
for continuing productivity-enhanced expansion of the rural nonfarm sector (Fan, Zhang 
and Robinson, 2003).  
The resulting productivity gains have benefited not only manufacturing but also 
service and commercial activity.  China’s 10-fold higher levels of FDI emerge 
significantly in the commercial sphere, where large regional and international retailers 
and supermarket chains have moved in large numbers (Reardon et al, 2003).  In the year 
2000 in food retailing, supermarkets held a 20% market share in China (nearly 50% in 
urban areas) compared to only 5% in India (Reardon et al., 2003).  The introduction of 
modern supply chain logistics and just-in-time inventory management by large regional   37
and international retailers has reduced marketing costs in China by as much as 40% 
(Reardon et al., 2003).   
(ii) Private Property Rights.  From the mid-1990s, the TVEs have been 
completely privatized through the creation of joint stock companies where the local 
governments are shareholders.  This marks a significant step towards recognition of 
private property rights that have been accepted as reality by the political leadership.  The 
change in ownership from local governments to private hands gives managers greater 
autonomy in running the firms, and can increase productivity and profit even further.  
(iii) Strong Regional Competition.  Regional policies in promoting rural nonfarm 
enterprises played an important role in the expansion of the sector. Different regions 
compete with each other in attracting investment and in opening up export markets.   
Regional competition in China created examples for catch-up within the country, leading 
to greater investment and output in the rural nonfarm sector.
9 
Weaknesses 
(i) Domestic Financing of Rural Nonfarm Activity.  China’s formal lending 
institutions are still in the initial stages of maturity.  The growth of TVEs and PEs until 
now has largely been through reinvestment of own resources.  However, with increased 
competition, profit margins get smaller, and the quantum of investible resources 
consequently becomes less.  In this context, a formal banking network with clearly 
defined lending policies is necessary for the rural enterprises to access capital, especially 
since formal financial markets (stock, bond, insurance etc.) are restricted.  Sustained 
growth in the rural nonfarm sector therefore depends critically on devising transparent 
and targeted financial institutions such as those currently operating in India. 
(ii) Protection of Workers’ Welfare.  In complete contrast to the rigidity of labor 
markets in India, the rural nonfarm labor force in China has few safeguards.  Labor 
markets in rural China are demand driven, and managers of firms are under few 
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restrictions to protect workers’ welfare.  While this arrangement can be beneficial for a 
massive absorption of labor from agriculture as happened in the decade of the 1980s, by 
the late 1990s labor market had become integrated in a very large measure.  Although 
mobilization for labor rights is still rare in China, pressure of public opinion from export 
markets regarding the poor working conditions has already become an international issue. 
Moreover, a more balanced relationship between workers and capitalists will help reduce 
social unrest and ensure more sustainable future growth of the nonfarm sector in China. 
 (iii) Regional Inequality.  Although increasing regional inequality is a matter of 
concern for both China and India, the problem is more acute in China.  Before economic 
reforms were initiated in the late 1970s, the emphasis had been on eliminating differences 
between regions through investment in social and physical capital.  From the early 1980s, 
different regions started growing at different rates (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005).  Nonfarm 
sector growth has been one of the main contributors to this divergence in regional 
development trajectory. 
From the emerging intra-regional inequality studies, the limits to privatization are 
becoming evident as well.  One factor is the withdrawal of the government from 
education and health spending.  Indicators of health and education in poorer regions of 
the country are actually showing signs of retrogression (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005).  This 
has long-term implications for the quality of the labor force in the rural areas, as we have 
seen in the case of India.  The warning signs for China should be India’s neglect of social 
capital investments over the last five decades.    39
V. CONCLUSIONS:  TOWARDS  GREATER NONFARM POLICY 
CONVERGENCE 
In spite of diametrically opposite political philosophies in post World War II 
China and India, many of their policies governing rural nonfarm activity proved 
remarkably similar.  After an early period of neglect, agricultural productivity growth 
became the cornerstone of rural development strategies in both countries, leading to a 
generally prosperous farm sector.  This formed the base of the demand for nonfarm goods 
and services in the rural areas, though more in the case of India than China.  
In India, the policy of protection and promotion of the nonfarm sector in the 
eighties was followed by the sudden opening-up of the sector to competition in the early 
1990s.  Under the new competitive environment, most small firms, especially those run 
by households with primitive technology, lost out badly in the period of competition and 
market integration that followed.  The shakeout in the rural nonfarm sector is continuing 
even now. 
Because of fewer price and quota protections on the rural nonfarm sector, China’s 
TVEs became internationally competitive more quickly than India’s rural nonfarm 
manufacturing enterprises when its economy was liberalized.  In China, in the planned 
era, protection was mainly on the state owned enterprises.  With the success of rural and 
agricultural reform in the early 1980s, agricultural productivity increased dramatically, 
channeling surplus to the development of local rural enterprises.  Since the 1980s, China 
has adopted a fiscal decentralization policy, providing a strong incentive for local 
governments to develop the TVE sector because they can keep most revenues from 
TVEs.  Facing hard budget and inter-jurisdictional competition, TVEs must be productive 
to survive in the marketplace.  As a result, the viable TVE sector gradually takes the 
share of relatively inefficient state-owned enterprises.  Coupled with open-door policy 
and export promotion, TVEs reaped the benefit of both internal and external market 
linkages.  Except during a short time period between 1989-1991, there has been 
comparatively greater policy consistency vis-à-vis the rural nonfarm sector in China than 
in India.   40
However, the issue of credit and finance to the rural nonfarm sector concerns 
policymakers in both countries. Although India has a more well-established network of 
rural credit, it suffers from inadequate delivery systems, which lead to bottlenecks in 
technological upgrading and output expansion. China on the other hand is in the process 
of setting up systems of credit delivery through normal banking channels, and setting up 
institutions to monitor the same.  
Until now, China’s high rates of FDI inflow have contrasted with the low levels 
for India as a reflection of the future potential of the two countries. This has been 
challenged recently, and the focus has shifted more towards the underlying institutional 
differences. It has been argued that the opening-up process is more stable in the case of 
India, where there is already a strong domestic manufacturing base, along with the 
support of a well-developed financial system and corporate governance (Huang and 
Khanna, 2003).  Given more flexible labor-market policies and a lifting of restriction on 
the scale of enterprises, India is poised to attract significantly higher levels of FDI in the 
manufacturing sector in the coming years. Judging by China’s experience, the rural 
nonfarm economy holds the potential for contributing to future economic growth in India. 
Pessimism about China stems largely from the slow pace of creating transparent 
capital markets and judicial system, leading to rent seeking and corruption (Tseng and 
Zebregs, 2002; Zhang and Tan, 2004).  Moreover, with nearly 90 percent of FDI going to 
coastal provinces in the south and east, regional inequality is growing much more rapidly 
than in India. The major challenge facing China in the coming years is to realign policies 
for a more equitable growth, both within and between regions.   
A review of the strengths and weaknesses of the rural nonfarm economy in China 
and India reveal interesting points of contrast.  Financial institutions catering to rural 
industries are one of India’s strengths, but are in the process of development in China.  
Physical and social infrastructure is a bottleneck for India but is one of the factors driving 
rural nonfarm growth in China. Decentralization and inter-regional competition has so far 
worked well in China, whereas centralized decision-making and redistributive allocations 
have stymied competition in India.  However, as China’s recent experience shows, there   41
needs to be a balance between decentralization and withdrawal of government’s role 
especially in the social sectors.  There are lessons to be learnt from both countries in this 
regard. 
India can learn from China on how to create a business-friendly investment 
environment by continuing to remove the regulatory burdens on small rural nonfarm 
enterprises and their transaction cost.  For China, it is time to learn from India to better 
protect the rights of both investors and workers as conflicts increase along with the scale 
of the rural nonfarm sector.   
Worsening inter- and intra-regional inequality in nonfarm development is 
probably the most pressing issue facing policymakers in both countries. Both countries 
face migration from regions of low rural nonfarm development to regions of high growth.  
As China and India face similar challenges in the future, we anticipate greater 
convergence in their rural nonfarm policy directions. 
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